Superior Court of the State of California
City and County of San Francisco
Diane Hegarty, Plaintiff
Anton LaVey and Does I-X inclusive, Defendants
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF EXPRESS CONTRACT,
PERFORMANCE, FAUD AND DECEIT, RESCISSION, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, PARTITION, AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
Comes now plaintiff, Diane Hegarty, formerly known as Diane
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, who alleges as follows:
1. Plaintiff is co-owner of real and personal property located
the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.
2. Defendant Anton LaVey, hereinafter referred to as defendant
LaVey, is co-owner with plaintiff of real and personal property
located in the City and County of San Francisco, State of
California. At all times herein relevant and to the present,
defendant LaVey was and is a resident of the City and County of San
3. The Does named herein are sued pursuant to the provisions
Section 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. When their
true names and capacities are ascertained, plaintiff will ask leave
of court to amend this complaint to so state.
4. On or about April 15, 1962 plaintiff and defendant LaVey
into an oral agreement to live together for the purpose of combining
their skills, efforts, labor, and earnings to raise Mr. LaVey's
daughter and to maintain property then occupied by defendant LaVey,
which was owned by defendant LaVey's father.
5. After entering into the above-referenced oral agreement,
plaintiff and defendant began to live together and thenceforward
held themselves out publicly as husband and wife, including filing
joint federal and state income tax returns. On November 19, 1963
plaintiff gave birth to a daughter, fathered by defendant LaVey and
surnamed LaVey according to defendant LaVey's express wishes.
6. On or about April 30, 1966 plaintiff and defendant formed a
partnership and took steps to create a not-for-profit corporation
under the laws of the State of California, using the fictitious
business name "Church of Satan". Plaintiff and defendant
participated equally in promoting and operating said business.
Plaintiff arranged publicity and handled all business aspects
including membership, correspondence, invoicing, payment of bills,
and typing and editing of manuscripts written by defendant LaVey,
namely the _Satanic Bible_, _Satanic Rituals_, _Compleat Witch_, and
as-yet-unpublished _Devil's Notebook_. Plaintiff also negotiated for
publication of foreign language editions of the books written by
defendant. Plaintiff and defendant continued the daily operation of
said business on an equal basis until April 1984. Subsequent to
April 1984 plaintiff continued to participate in said business by
managing the correspondence and bookkeeping aspects of said business
until on or about August 1, 1986.
7. On or about July 9, 1971 Michael Levey, father of defendant
LaVey, gave the property known as 6114 California Street, San
Francisco, California to Anton and Diane LaVey, his wife, by grant
deed. The consideration for this gift by Michael Levey was that
plaintiff and defendant would pay any indebtedness previously
incurred against the property by Michael Levey. A true copy of said
deed is attached as Exhibit #A and incorporated herein by this
reference. Simultaneously plaintiff and defendant LaVey sought and
obtained refinancing upon said property, obtaining the loan as
husband and wife. Plaintiff and defendant LaVey, who had
continuously resided at said property since April 1962, continued to
reside together at said property until April 30, 1984, when
plaintiff left the premises. Defendant LaVey continues to live at
8. Between the dates of April 1962 and April 1984, while
and defendant continued to live together, plaintiff was periodically
subjected to physical and verbal abuse by defendant LaVey.
9. Because of defendant's violent and abusive behavior,
left the family residence in fear for her life on or about April 30,
1984. Plaintiff sought and obtained restraining orders against
defendant LaVey in San Francisco Superior Court Case #825962. Said
orders, which are effective for one year from date of issuance, were
renewed on October 21, 1985 and October 29, 1986. Defendant has not
stopped harassing and threatening plaintiff despite the existence of
said orders. Defendant has made both oral and written threats
against plaintiff between the dates of April 30, 1984 and present.
10. On or about April 26, 1985 plaintiff and defendant LaVey
into a written agreement regarding the characterization of real and
personal property which they had accumulated during the 22 years
while living and working together, and regarding their intentions as
to such real and personal property. A true copy of said agreement,
signed by the parties thereto, is attached to this complaint as
Exhibit #B and incorporated herein by this reference.
11. Pursuant to the terms of the written agreement as
alleged, at Paragraph #9 of said agreement, plaintiff and defendant
LaVey were to share occupancy of the jointly-owned real property.
Plaintiff and defendant LaVey agreed that said real property would
be remodeled to provide separate access to the floors to be occupied
by each party. Defendant LaVey failed and refused to cooperate with
the terms of the agreement with respect to the remodeling, and
dishonored all provisions made in said agreement to ensure
12. As a result of defendant LaVey's refusal to permit
of a separate entrance to plaintiff's private quarters, and as a
result of defendant LaVey's constant intrusions upon plaintiff's
agreed-upon portion of said property without the permission or
consent of plaintiff, plaintiff feared for her personal safety and
was thus rendered unable to reside at the premises.
13. Since the date upon which plaintiff realized she would be
to occupy that portion of the property designated as her private
quarters, she has attempted to arrive at an equitable division of
the property characterized as jointly-owned. She has made repeated
telephonic and written requests of defendant LaVey to participate in
a plan for dividing said property. Plaintiff and defendant LaVey met
together, with counsel, in November 1987 for the stated purpose of
effecting such division, but defendant LaVey refused to consider all
proposals made at that time. On or about March 20, 1988 plaintiff
wrote to defendant LaVey stating her desire to divide the jointly-
owned real and personal property by sale and giving giving defendant
LaVey 30 days within which to respond. Defendant LaVey made no
response to plaintiff's demand.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(for specific performance or damages based upon breach of express
14. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates the
contained in paragraphs #1-3 and #10-13 as though fully set forth.
15. On or about April 26, 1985 plaintiff and defendant LaVey
into a written agreement, hereinafter referred to as "agreement", a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit #B and incorporated
herein by this reference. The purpose of said agreement was to
"memorialize" their 23-year relationship and to "memorialize" the
nature of the real and personal property acquired by the parties
during the 23 years of their relationship and partnership. The
agreement did not purport to effect an actual division of said
property, with the exception that the agreement contemplated an
equitable partition of the jointly-owned real property, to enable
both parties to continue to occupy said real property while
continuing to operate the family business, and to maintain joint
possession and control of the jointly-owned personal property.
16. Paragraph #4 of said agreement states that the property
as Attachment #C of the agreement, which attachment includes the
California Street property and residence, is property jointly owned
and acquired by the parties during their relationship and
partnership. Said property is hereafter referred to as "equitable
17. As heretofore alleged, on or about August 1, 1986
LaVey breached the agreement to divide the real property by his
refusal to remodel the real property to create private quarters for
plaintiff to occupy. Such refusal by defendant LaVey rendered the
written agreement worthless to plaintiff.
18. Because of defendant LaVey's failure and refusal to act in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, defendant LaVey has
breached said agreement. Plaintiff has lost the use of her residence
and has lost possession and control of the jointly-owned personal
property, all to her actual damage in an amount to be determined.
19. Because of defendant LaVey's breach of the agreement to
utilize property jointly with plaintiff, plaintiff has been rendered
unable to reside at the jointly-owned real property and has lost
possession and control of the jointly-owned personal property, all
to her actual damage in an amount to be determined.
20. Plaintiff has been forced to secure replacement housing at
substantial rent and to purchase household furniture and
furnishings. Having devoted herself to the development of the family
business, plaintiff was forced to enter the job market without
references or resume in order to support herself, all to her damage
in an amount to be determined.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(for specific performance or damages based upon breach of express
21. Plaintiff realleges and thereby incorporates herein the
allegations contained in paragraphs #1-7 and paragraphs #10-13 of
the within complaint.
22. In furtherance of the oral agreement, as alleged in
#4, plaintiff and defendant LaVey lived together, raised children
together, and founded and conducted all of the business endeavors of
the Church of Satan together until April 1984.
23. In April 1984 defendant LaVey drove plaintiff from the
residence by force and threats of violence. Plaintiff continued to
render her services and contribute her skills, efforts, and labor to
the Church of Satan until August 1986.
24. During the 22 years that plaintiff and defendant LaVey
together, they acquired as a result of their skills, efforts, labor,
and earnings certain real and personal property, hereinafter
referred to as "equitable property", consisting of the following:
-- (a) Real property and residence located at 6114 California
Street, San Francisco, California, such real property being conveyed
to them as husband and wife by grant deed on July 9, 1971.
-- (b) Furniture, furnishings, art objects, antiques, and
effects currently located at the above residence, such items listed
specifically in the written agreement executed between the parties
attached to this complaint as Exhibit #B and incorporated herein by
-- (c) Such other and further equitable property as may have
accumulated between the parties through their efforts while living
together which is not now listed on any agreement between the
parties but may be discovered subsequently. Plaintiff will ask leave
of the court to amend this complaint to set forth the exact
description and value of any such after-discovered equitable
property when such information has been discovered.
25. In April 1985 plaintiff and defendant LaVey entered into a
written agreement which memorializes the oral agreement under which
they had obtained property during cohabitation. This writing, the
Hegarty-LaVey agreement, is attached as Exhibit #B.
26. By terms of the agreement plaintiff and defendant LaVey
equally share access to the jointly-owned real property and to the
jointly-owned personal property.
27. Plaintiff has at all times performed each and every
condition by her to be performed as contemplated by the terms of the
oral agreement, subsequently memorialized in the written agreement.
28. Defendant LaVey has breached the oral agreement, as
in the written agreement, by failing and refusing to equitably
partition the family residence, thereby enabling plaintiff to reside
therein and to maintain her access to the jointly-owned personal
property, all to plaintiff's general damage in an amount to be
29. Defendant LaVey has further breached the oral agreement,
memorialized in the written agreement, by failing and refusing to
respond to plaintiff's written request that the real and personal
property be divided by sale and division of the proceeds, all to
plaintiff's general damage in an amount to be determined.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(for damages for fraud and deceit)
30. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the
contained in paragraphs #1-3 and #10-13 as though fully set forth.
31. On or about April 26, 1985 defendant LaVey falsely and
fraudulently and with intent to deceive and defraud plaintiff,
represented to plaintiff by means of the written agreement attached
hereto as Exhibit #B that he would participate in remodeling the
real property jointly owned by the parties in order to provide
plaintiff with exclusive access to and use of the top floor of said
32. Said representations were false, and defendant knew them
false. In truth and in fact defendant LaVey never intended to
relinquish any portion of the real property to plaintiff for her
exclusive use and access, nor did defendant LaVey ever intend to
refrain from intruding upon plaintiff in her quiet enjoyment of her
portion of the property.
33. Plaintiff believed and relied upon the said
by defendant LaVey, and was thereby induced to refrain from
requesting an immediate division or sale of the property and to
continue to make her services available to defendant LaVey in the
34. Plaintiff did not discover the fraud and deceit practiced
her until the summer of 1986, when defendant LaVey specifically
disavowed any intention ever to divide the property as contemplated
by the agreement or to allow plaintiff to lease her portion of the
premises to a third party. Plaintiff could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered said fraud and deceit prior to the summer
of 1986 because defendant LaVey continued to assure plaintiff that
the contemplated remodeling would be performed as soon as a plan
could be agreed upon and material and workers secured.
35. As a direct and proximate result of the fraudulent
representations of defendant LaVey to plaintiff, plaintiff has been
damaged by having to abandon the jointly-owned premises and to
abandon, in addition, her access to and enjoyment of the jointly-
owned personal property, which personal property remains situated in
the jointly-owned premises. Plaintiff has been forced to secure
substitute lodging at substantially higher cost and to obtain all
furniture and furnishings for such lodging, all to her general
damage in an amount to be determined.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(for rescission of agreement based on fraudulent misrepresentation)
36. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the
contained in paragraphs #30-35.
37. In truth and in fact the agreement entered into between
plaintiff and defendant LaVey is voidable as to plaintiff because of
the material false and fraudulent representations by defendant
LaVey, as heretofore alleged.
38. Pursuant to the instrument and in reliance on defendant
representations, plaintiff continued to make her services available
to the Church of Satan while remaining out of possession and control
of the jointly-owned real and personal property. Defendant LaVey has
had exclusive use, enjoyment, possession, and control of the
jointly-owned real and personal property, all to plaintiff's general
damage, in an amount to be determined.
39. Defendant LaVey made the representations for the purpose
inducing plaintiff to sign the agreement, and plaintiff would not
have signed the agreement if defendant LaVey had not made the
representations and if plaintiff had not believed the
representations to be true.
40. Plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of the fraud by
defendant LaVey and as a result of her signing the agreement as a
result of that fraud.
41. Plaintiff has reasonable grounds to believe that, if left
outstanding, the instrument may cause serious injury to her in that
defendant will rely upon certain portions of the agreement to
prevent an equitable division by sale of the jointly-owned real and
personal property and division of the net proceeds of sale. The
amount of damage that the instrument, if left outstanding, may cause
to plaintiff is as yet undetermined but is estimated at more than
42. Plaintiff discovered that the representations were false
about August 1, 1986. Subsequent to that date plaintiff has proposed
modifications to the agreement which defendant LaVey has refused to
consider. On or about March 20, 1988 plaintiff notified defendant
LaVey in a letter, attached hereto as Exhibit #C and incorporated
herein by this reference, that she elected to cancel the agreement
and divide the jointly-owned real and personal property by sale.
43. Defendant LaVey failed and refused to respond to this
within the time specified, and wholly refuses to restore plaintiff
to joint possession and control of the jointly-owned real and
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress - Civil
Code Section 3294, 3333)
44. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the
contained in paragraphs #1-3, #9, and #30-33.
45. On or about February 21, 1984 plaintiff sought and
psychiatric counseling for a mental impairment resulting from years
of physical and emotional abuse at the hands of defendant LaVey.
Such counseling continues at present.
46. On or about April 30, 1984 plaintiff was forced by
threats and violence to leave the family residence. Plaintiff sought
and obtained, in 1984, 1985, and 1986, restraining orders
prohibiting defendant LaVey from harassing or molesting her. Despite
the existence of said restraining orders, defendant LaVey continued
to contact plaintiff with threats of violence, both written and
telephonic, until January 1988.
47. Defendant LaVey never intended to relinquish any portion
real property, as contemplated by the written agreement of April
1985, to plaintiff for her exclusive use, access, and quiet
48. Defendant LaVey always intended to prevent plaintiff from
exercising her rights to possession and control of the jointly-owned
real and personal property.
49. Defendant LaVey never intended to permit plaintiff to
her right to liquidate her share of the jointly-owned real and
50. Defendant LaVey's conduct was intentional, malicious, and
for the purpose of causing plaintiff to suffer humiliation, mental
anguish, and emotional, physical, and economic distress. Defendant's
conduct in performing the acts heretofore alleged was done with
knowledge that plaintiff's emotional and physical distress would
thereby increase, and was done with a wanton and reckless disregard
of the foreseeable consequences to plaintiff.
51. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned
plaintiff did suffer and continues to suffer humiliation, mental
anguish, and emotional, physical, and economic distress, and has
been injured in mind as follows: Plaintiff's anxiety and terror of
defendant have forced her to obtain ongoing psychiatric counseling,
the cost of which is as yet undetermined. Plaintiff is informed and
believes and thereon alleges that such counseling will be needed
over a long term.
52. The aforementioned acts by defendant LaVey left plaintiff
without employment and ill-prepared to enter the marketplace.
Although plaintiff has obtained employment, her mental and emotional
condition precludes her from pursuing a career or from working full-
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(dissolution of partnership, an accounting, and a receivership)
53. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the
contained in paragraphs #1-3 and 6 as though set forth in full.
54. On or about April 1965 at San Francisco, California plaintiff
and defendant entered into an oral agreement of partnership, to wit:
that in exchange for plaintiff's participation with defendant in the
founding of the Church of Satan, as well as her subsequent
assumption of front-office responsibilities (including record-
keeping, correspondence, and public relations), plaintiff would
receive fair monetary remuneration for her labor.
55. Said Church was indeed founded by defendant and plaintiff
about April 1965 at San Francisco, California.
56. On or about April 1965 plaintiff began performing her
described above, as office manager of the Church. Plaintiff
faithfully executed these responsibilities from the Church's
inception in 1965 until February 1984, when threats and violence
directed towards her by defendant LaVey made it impossible for them
to work together and plaintiff was forced to abandon her control of
the enterprise to defendant LaVey, who currently retains sole
control of the business, including exclusive control over access to
financial records and assets. Plaintiff continued to make her
services as bookkeeper and correspondent available to defendant
LaVey and the business until April 1986, at which time, upon request
of defendant LaVey, plaintiff trained a person of defendant LaVey's
choosing to perform the above-described tasks.
57. On or about April 16, 1986 defendant took exclusive
and control of the business and has since had for his individual use
and benefit large sums of money from the receipts of the partnership
business (including royalties), exceeding his rightful share, and
has refused to account to plaintiff for the same. Plaintiff is
informed and believes, and on such information and belief alleges,
that the sum wrongfully taken by defendant, and the amount due the
partnership, is at least $300,000.
58. The property and accounts of the partnership are in danger
being lost, removed, or materially injured in that plaintiff has
been excluded from partnership business and partnership funds have
been misappropriated, and it is necessary that a receiver be
appointed to take possession of all property and accounts of the
partnership to receive accounts payable, pay current debts, and wind
up the business of the partnership.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(partition of real property)
59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the
contained in paragraphs #1-3 and 7 as though fully set forth.
60. The real property which is the subject of this action is
in the City and County of San Francisco, at 6114 California Street,
and is legally described in the deed attached hereto as Exhibit A.
61. Plaintiff is the owner of a full interest in joint tenancy
said real property.
62. Defendant LaVey owns an interest identical to that of
which interest plaintiff reasonably believes will be materially
affected by this action.
63. Partition is hereby sought of the interests in the real
of plaintiff and of defendant LaVey.
64. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges
partition by sale of the real property, rather than physical
division thereof, would be more equitable to the parties.
65. Partition of the real property and interests therein is in
best interests of both parties hereto in that, as heretofore
alleged, they are unable to share equally in the benefits of
ownership and plaintiff's interest in the real property has
therefore been impaired.
66. The prosecution by plaintiff of this participation action
the common benefit of plaintiff and defendant LaVey. Plaintiff has
incurred and is continuing to incur reasonable attorney's fees in
the prosecution of this action.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the
contained in paragraphs #1-66 as though set forth in full.
68. An actual controversy has arisen between plaintiff and
defendants, and each of them, relating to the legal rights, duties,
and obligations of said parties, to wit:
-- A. Plaintiff contends:
---- (1) As a result of the oral and written agreements
plaintiff and defendant LaVey, plaintiff is the owner of one-half of
all the aforementioned property as joint tenant with defendant
---- (2) All of said equitable property was acquired while the
parties were living in the State of California, and is located in
this state, and should be treated as would community property if
there were a valid marriage entered into between plaintiff and
defendant LaVey. Not to enforce plaintiff's rights in this regard
would constitute a denial of due process and equal protection of the
law under the United States and California Constitutions.
---- (3) Defendant LaVey is estopped from denying the validity
effectiveness of said agreements by reason of:
------ (a) Defendant had the benefit of plaintiff's services
caretaker and parent to his children for 23 years.
------ (b) Defendant had the benefit of plaintiff's equal
participation with the business known as the Church of Satan,
including her services as writer, editor, public relations person,
correspondent, membership tabulator, bookkeeper, secretary,
treasurer, and receptionist, which promoted the goodwill and success
of such business.
------ (c) Defendant executed the written agreement of April
1985 acknowledging his indebtedness to plaintiff for her services
and further acknowledging that all property, both real and personal,
as described in Attachment #C to said agreement was to be considered
property owned jointly by plaintiff and defendant LaVey.
------ (d) Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer
irreparable financial loss by reason of being denied access to the
jointly-owned property for purposes of use or sale.
---- (4) In the alternative, should this court not enforce the
agreements, plaintiff, by reason of the facts heretofore alleged,
has suffered damages in excess of $500,000. The exact amount of said
damages has not been presently ascertained by plaintiff, who will
ask leave of the court to amend this complaint to insert the exact
amount upon ascertainment of same or according to proof.
69. No adequate remedy, other than herein prayed for, exists
which the rights of the parties hereto may be determined.
70. Plaintiff desires a judicial determination of the rights,
duties, obligations, and interests of the parties and a further
determination of the validity of the agreement of the parties.
Wherefore plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1. Under the First Cause of Action:
-- (a) For actual and special damages according to proof.
2. Under the Second Cause of Action:
-- (a) For enforcement of the agreement of the parties as regards
division of the property.
-- (b) For actual and special damages according to proof.
-- (c) For attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
3. Under the Third Cause of Action:
-- (a) For actual and special damages according to proof.
-- (b) For exemplary damages.
-- (c) For costs of suit.
4. Under the Fourth Cause of Action:
-- (a) For rescission of the agreement of the parties.
-- (b) For equitable division of the jointly-owned property by sale
and division of the proceeds.
5. Under the Fifth Cause of Action:
-- (a) For actual and special damages according to proof.
-- (b) For exemplary damages.
6. Under the Sixth Cause of Action:
-- (a) That the partnership be dissolved.
-- (b) That an account be taken of all accounts and property of the
partnership, that the account be settled between plaintiff and
defendant, and that plaintiff have judgment against defendant for
any and all sums that may be found due and owing to plaintiff.
-- (c) That a receiver be appointed, with the usual powers and
duties, to take possession of the property and assets of the
partnership, to wind up the affairs of the partnership, and to have
custody of the accounts and property of the partnership pending
their final distribution to the partners.
-- (d) For damages against defendant in an amount to be determined.
-- (e) That the property of the partnership be sold and the
partnership debts and liabilities be paid off and the surplus, if
any, be divided between the plaintiff and defendant according to
their respective interests.
-- (f) That pending final settlement of all partnership affairs
defendant be enjoined from disposing of the partnership credits,
debts, or moneys, or receiving moneys or other property or effects
of said partnership, or from entering into any new transactions in
the name of or on behalf of the partnership.
-- (g) For costs of this action.
-- (h) For such other and further relief as the court may deem
7. Under the Seventh Cause of Action:
-- (a) For partition of the real property according to the
respective rights of the parties.
-- (b) For division of the real property by sale and for division of
the proceeds of sale according to the respective rights of the
-- (c) For reasonable attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in
prosecuting this action for the common benefit of the parties.
-- (d) For all costs of suit.
8. Under the Eighth Cause of Action:
-- (a) For a determination of the validity of the agreement of the
-- (b) For a judicial determination of the rights, duties,
obligations, and interests of the parties.
9. Under all causes of action, for such other and further
the court may deem just and proper.
Dated December 7, 1988
/s/ Catherine Fancher Campbell
/s/ Elizabeth Benford
Attorneys for plaintiff Diane Hegarty
I am the plaintiff in the within action. I have reviewed the
Amended Complaint for Breach of Express Contract, Specific
Performance, Fraud and Deceit, Rescission, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, Partition, and Declaratory Relief, and the same
is true of my own knowledge except those matters therein alleged
upon information and belief and, as to those matters, I believe them
to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
correct. Executed this 7th day of December 1988 at San Francisco,
/s/ Diane Hegarty
[back to menu]